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Abstract
This article aims to analyze the link between subsidiary capital
structure and taxation in Europe. First we introduce a trade-o¤
model, which looks at a MNCs nancial strategy and in particular
debt shifting from low-tax to high-tax jurisdictions. By letting the
MNC choose both leverage and the prot shifting percentage, we de-
part from the relevant literature which has mainly focused on the lat-
ter. Using the AMADEUS dataset we show that: i) in line with the
relevant literature, subsidiary leverage increases with its statutory tax
rate; ii) contrary to previous work, if a parent company is located in a
high-tax country and its subsidiary is making prot, an increase in the
parent companys tax rate has a positive impact on the subsidiarys
leverage.
JEL classication: G31, H25, H32.
Keywords: capital structure, default, debt shifting, multination-
als, taxation.
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1 Introduction
Research on multinational companies (MNCs) has gathered interesting evi-
dence regarding both nancing decisions and their ability to shift debt from
high- to low-tax jurisdictions. In particular, this evidence shows that the
amount of debt shifted depends on tax rate di¤erentials.
Most empirical work on MNCs choices is based on US and Canadian
data.1 More recently, however, scholars have focused on tax determinants
of European company strategy. In particular, Buettner et al. (2006, 2009),
Buettner and Wamser (2007), Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005), Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2005, 2010) and Overesch and Wamser (2010) have analyzed
the impact of taxation on German companies. Huizinga et al. (2008) have
applied a static model of a multinational rms optimal debt shifting policy.
Using the AMADEUS rm-level dataset for European companies, they have
shown that their theoretical predictions are supported by the empirical evi-
dence. In particular, a foreign subsidiarys capital structure depends on local
corporate tax rates as well as on the di¤erence between its parent companys
tax rate and other foreign subsidiariesrates.
It is worth noting that the existing literature has used the di¤erential
between the subsidiarys and the parent companys tax rate, as the main
determinant of debt shifting within a group. In particular, denoting this
di¤erential as (A   B) ; with A and B as the parent company and sub-
sidiary tax rate, respectively, scholars expect that B stimulates the sub-
sidiarys leverage and that the opposite is true when A rises. As will be
shown, however, tax e¤ects are more complex. This is due to the fact that
taxes a¤ect both a MNCs borrowing decision and the distribution of debt
1For instance, Collins and Shackelford (1992) and Froot and Hines (1995) use con-
solidated nancial accounting data from Compustat. They show that a rms nancial
activities are a¤ected by taxation. Altshuler and Mintz (1995) studied the impact of the
changes to interest allocation rules in the 1986 tax reform, using the data of large compa-
nies. Desai et al. (2004) used condential individual data and nd that tax rates strongly
a¤ect the use of debt by a¢ liates. Their central estimate is that a 10% higher tax rate
is associated with 2.8% higher a¢ liate debt as a proportion of assets. Internal debt is
particularly sensitive.
A related topic about income shifting activities was dealt with by Altshuler and Grubert
(2003), Desai et al. (2004), Graham and Tucker (2005), Hines (1999), Jon and Tang (2001),
Mills and Newberry (2004), Newberry and Dhaliwahl (2001), Mintz (2000) and Mintz and
Smart (2004). For further details, see also Graham (2005), Graham and Tucker (2006),
Devereux (2007) and de Moij (2011).
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among its entities. In other terms, taxation a¤ects not only the benet of
each Euro of debt shifted from one country to another (according to the
relevant literature), but also the absolute value of borrowing.
In order to analyze a MNCs nancial choices, we will use a continuous-
time trade-o¤ model, where default is a contingent event, which depends on
the EBITs volatility as well as on other deep parameters (such as the risk-
free interest rate and the expected growth of EBIT). We will then study a
MNCs choices in terms of both optimal leverage and debt shifting. As will
be shown, the parent companys tax rate may have a positive e¤ect on a
subsidiarys leverage. The reasoning behind our nding is straightforward.
On the one hand, an increase in the parent companys tax rate A reduces
the tax benet of shifting debt from the parent company to its subsidiary.
On the other hand, the tax rate increase raises the MNCs overall tax rate,
thereby increasing the tax benet of interest deductibility. This latter e¤ect
encourages the MNC to raise debt. In turn, debt is divided between the par-
ent company and the subsidiary. If therefore this latter e¤ect dominates the
former, the parent tax rate has a positive impact on a subsidiarys leverage.2
In order to test the predictions of our theoretical model, we look at the
link between subsidiariescapital structure and taxation in Europe. Using
the AMADEUS dataset, we will use subsidiary leverage as the dependent
variable and show that, in line with the existing literature, it increases with
its host country tax rate (B). Moreover, if the parent company is located in
a high-tax country and its subsidiary is protable, an increase in the parent
company tax rate has a positive impact on its subsidiarys leverage. This
result contrasts with previous ndings.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the trade-o¤
model and focuses on the tax determinants of nancial choices. Section 3
deals with the AMADEUS dataset and discusses some preliminary evidence
on our sample. Section 4 and 5 provide an empirical investigation of the
determinants of subsidiariesnancial structure. Section 6 summarizes our
ndings.
2Ramb and Weichenrieder (2005) studied the impact of parent companiestax rates.
However, they showed that parent tax rates have no statistically signicant e¤ect on
subsidiariesleverage. More recently, Overesch and Wamser (2010) have studied the e¤ects
of parent companiestax rates on parent companiescapital structure.
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2 The model
In this section we introduce a trade-o¤model describing the nancial choices
of a MNC consisting of a parent company resident in country A and a sub-
sidiary located in country B. Here, we assume that our MNC (both the parent
company and its subsidiary) can borrow from a third-party lender operating
in a perfectly competitive sector, which is characterized by a given risk-free
interest rate r and by symmetric information.
As pointed out in the introduction, we will let our MNC choose both its
overall leverage and the distribution of debt within the group. To complete
our framework, we will also introduce the following:
Assumption 1 The MNCs EBIT (Earning Before Interest and Taxes), de-
ned as (t), follows a geometric Brownian motion
d(t)
 (t)
= dt+ dz (t) ; with (0) > 0; (1)
where  is the expected rate of growth,  is the instantaneous standard devi-
ation of d(t)
(t)
, and dz (t) is the increment of a Wiener process.
Assumption 2 Within the multinational group, the parent company pro-
duces a portion  2 (0; 1) of the overall EBIT; the remaining part (1  ) is
produced by its foreign subsidiary.
Assumption 3 At time 0, the MNC can decide how much to borrow and
consequently pays a constant coupon, dened as C, for debt nance.
Assumption 4 Debt is optimally divided between the parent company and
its subsidiary with weights a and (1  a), respectively.
Assumption 5 Debt is non-renegotiable and default occurs when the MNCs
net cash ow falls to zero.
Assumption 6 The cost of default is  2 (0; 1) times the value of the bank-
rupt MNC.
According to assumption 1, a MNCs EBIT evolves stochastically and is
jointly produced by the parent company A and the subsidiary B, with weights
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(see assumption 2)  and (1  ), respectively.3 According to assumption 3,
the MNC chooses its leverage ratio by setting a coupon C.4 Assumption 4
states that the MNC chooses how to divide debt between the parent company
and its subsidiary.
As explained by Smith and Warner (1979), if debt renegotiation is costly
or even impossible (according to assumption 5), default may take place.5 In
our model, default occurs when the MNCs net cash ow falls to zero.6 In
this case, the MNC is expropriated by the lender, who faces a sunk cost.7
In line with Leland (1994), such a cost is assumed to be proportional to the
MNC value (assumption 6).
Taxation plays a crucial role in our model. Indeed, with zero tax rates,
the MNC would have no incentive to borrow: debt nance might cause costly
default with no benet. When however, taxation is introduced and interest
payments are deductible, debt nance leads to tax savings. Hence, both A
and B will a¤ect debt nance.
For simplicity, we assume that taxation is fully symmetric (i.e., prot
and loss are treated symmetrically) and that it follows the source principle.8
In this case, the MNC nds it optimal to borrow by trading o¤ the tax
benet of interest deductibility and the expected cost of default. According
to assumption 4, debt can be divided between the parent company and its
subsidiary.
It is worth noting that, whenever tax rates are di¤erent, a MNC has
an incentive to shift debt. In particular, we expect that the MNCs entities
will sign a nancial arrangement according to which the entity operating in a
3By setting  and (1  ) as exogenously given, we assume that the locational choice
has already been made. We leave the joint analysis of locational and nancial decisions
for future research.
4Given C we can calculate the fair value of debt. For further details on this point see
Leland (1994). Also, notice that here we focus on pure debt nance. For an analysis of
hybrid derivatives and their tax treatment see Panteghini (2011).
5For an analysis of costly debt renegotiation see, e.g., Goldstein et al. (2001).
6This also implies that debt is secured. As explained by Smith and Warner (1979, p.
127) "[s]ecuring debt gives bondholders title to pledged assets until the bonds are paid
in full". As pointed out by Leland (1994), minimum net-worth requirements, implied by
secured debt, are more common in short-term debt nancing.
7For further details on default conditions see Smith and Warner (1979), and Leland
(1994). For a study of corporate taxation under default risk see also Panteghini (2006,
2007 and 2011).
8Notice that the existence of deferral possibilities and limited credit rules can de facto
lead to the application of the source principle.
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high-tax country borrows from the entity placed in the low-tax country. This
leads to the payment of an interest which reduces (increases) the reported
prot where taxation is high (low). The MNCs overall tax burden is thus
reduced.
Shifting debt is costly. This is due to the joint e¤ect of two factors: one
is related to advising activities and the other to anti-avoidance rules. On the
one hand, shifting debt usually requires the costly advice of tax and nancial
experts. On the other hand, countries aim to prevent tax-avoiding practices
by introducing ad hoc rules, such as thin capitalization and earning-stripping
devices.9 It is worth noting that if tax rates were equal, there would be no
tax incentive to divide debt and EBIT with di¤erent weights. Denoting a
and (1  a) as the parent companys and subsidiarys weight, respectively,
we would expect that given the same tax rate, the equalities a =  and
(1  a) = (1  ) hold. If however tax rates were di¤erent, the MNC could
set a 6=  so as to minimize its overall tax burden. Denoting  (a) as the
concealment cost paid by the MNC to shift debt from one entity to another,
we introduce the following:
Assumption 7 Debt shifting entails a quadratic concealment cost function,
i.e.,
 (a) =
n
4

(  a)2 + [(1  )  (1  a)]2	 :
According to assumption 7, setting a 6=  is costly. As usual, we as-
sume that such a cost function is quadratic. Moreover, it is proportional
to the sum between the parent companys debt shifting cost, (  a)2, and
the subsidiarys one, [(1  )  (1  a)]2. Parameter n allows us to deal
with both institutional determinants and advising activities. In other terms,
the introduction of thin capitalization and earning-stripping rules, aimed at
preventing any tax avoidance activity, raises n and hence the costs of debt
shifting. Moreover, the decrease in the cost of tax sheltering operations,
which is linked to the degradation of book and tax prots (see, e.g., Desai,
2003, 2005), leads to a decrease in n.
For simplicity, we will assume that the concealment cost is non-deductible
and that it is imputed to the parent company.10 Given these assumptions,
9For a discussion on the application of these devices in EU countries see Garbarino and
Panteghini (2007), and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010).
10The quality of results would not change if we assumed partial or full deductibility of
such costs (see Panteghini and Schjelderup, 2006).
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we can now write the MNCs after-tax prot function:
N () = f(1  A) [  aC]   (a)Cg
parent companys after-tax prot
+f(1  B) [(1  )  (1  a)C]g
subsidiarys after-tax prot
= (1  b)  [1  C (a)]C;
(2)
where b  A+(1  ) B is the MNCs e¤ective tax rate levied on a MNCs
EBIT and
C (a)  Aa+ B (1  a)   (a) (3)
is the net tax benet of debt nance.
According to assumption 5, default occurs when N () goes to zero.
Therefore, setting (2) equal to zero and solving for  gives the default thresh-
old point:11
 =
1  C (a)
1  b C: (4)
Using (4) we can now write the MNCs value (see Appendix A) as:
V (C; a; ) =
(1  b)

+
C (a)C
r
 

 (1  b)

+
C (a)C
r



2
; (5)
where  = r  is the so-called dividend yield (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994)
and 2 =
1
2
  
2
 
q 

2
  1
2
2
+ 2r
2
< 0.12 As can be seen, function (5)
consists of three terms. The rst term measures the net present value of
the after-tax EBIT. The second term measures the overall net benet arising
from debt nancing. The third term measures the expected cost of default.
This cost is proportional to the coupon paid. Moreover, it depends both on
the tax benet lost (i.e., C (a)) after default and on the cost of default. The
term
 


2 measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the event of
default.
11The quality of results does not change if we set a di¤erent threshold value. For further
details on default conditions, see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz (1977), Smith and Warner
(1979), and Leland (1994).
12For simplicity, we let  be non-negative (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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2.1 The MNCs choices
As pointed out, the MNC takes two tax-motivated decisions. Accordingly,
it chooses both the overall coupon (C) and the percentage of debt shifting
(a). Given (5), a and C are the solutions of the following problem:13
max
C;a
V (C; a; ) : (6)
Solving (6) we obtain (see Appendix B):
a = +
A   B
n
(7)
and
C =
8><>: 1  b1  C (a)
24 C (a)
(1  2)
h
r(1 C(a))

+ C (a)
i
35  12
9>=>;: (8)
As shown in (7), a depends on the tax rate di¤erential (A   B). If
A = B, no debt is shifted and the overall amount of debt is divided with
weights  and (1  ). Otherwise, it is optimal for the MNC to choose a
di¤erent allocation of debt. In particular, if A > B; the MNC shifts debt
from the foreign to the home country and vice versa. Using (7) the tax
benet of shifting 1 Euro of debt is equal to:
C (a
) = Aa + B (1  a)   (a) = b + (A   B)2
2n
:
As can be seen, the optimal tax benet C (a) depends on both the MNCs
e¤ective tax rate b and the tax rate di¤erential (A   B). As can be seen,
the inequality C (a) > b holds if A 6= B. This means that the default
threshold point (of Eq. (4)) is less than the optimal coupon, C.14
When the equality A = B holds, it is easy to show that @C

@

A=B=
> 0
(see Panteghini 2007). When however tax rates are di¤erent, the e¤ect of
taxation on C is much more complex, since it depends on both the e¤ective
13The maximization of the MNCs overall value (including debt) implicitly rules out any
agency conict between shareholders and the lender.
14Due to full tax symmetry, if the MNCs EBIT  ranges between  and C (and so
the group is making a loss), it is optimal not to default to exploit interest deductibility.
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tax rate b and the net tax benet C (a) : In particular, the choice of a
a¤ects C (a) and therefore the choice of the coupon. It is worth noting
that so far, this e¤ect has not been treated by the existing literature.15
2.2 The subsidiarys leverage
As pointed out in the introduction, we will focus on subsidiaries leverage
ratio. Given the solutions of Problem (6), we can calculate the subsidiarys
coupon as CS  (1  a)C: It is easy to show that:
dCS
dB
> 0:
Not surprisingly, an increase in B is expected to raise CS: such a tax rate
increase causes a rise in the MNCs average tax rate, thereby stimulating
borrowing. Moreover, it induces the MNC to shift more debt towards the
host country where the subsidiary operates.
The e¤ect of A, however, is ambiguous. As shown in Appendix C, dif-
ferentiating CS w.r.t. A gives:
dCS
dA
=
8>>><>>>:

  1
1  a
da
dA

| {z }
<0
+

1
C
dC
dA

| {z }
?0
9>>>=>>>;CS: (9)
As shown in (9), the e¤ect of an increase in A is twofold. On the one hand,
an increase in the parent companys tax rate A reduces the tax benet of
shifting debt towards the subsidiary: this reduces the optimal debt weigh
(1  a) : On the other hand, the increase in A may raise the weighted
average of a MNCs tax rate C (a), thereby stimulating the group to increase
borrowing: this leads to an increase in the overall coupon C: Since the
impact of A on the subsidiarys coupon may have the opposite sign, the net
e¤ect is ambiguous. As shown in Appendix C, if A > B we have dC

dA
> 0:
in this case, the latter e¤ect always dominates the former one. As will be
15As shown in (8), C is proportional to the current EBIT, . It is also easy to prove
that @C

@ < 0; i.e., an increase in the sunk cost of default reduces the propensity to borrow.
As shown by Leland (1994), the value of debt is a U-shaped function of volatility (i.e., it
increases up to a certain threshold value of the coupon). For further details see Leland
(1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001).
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shown in the empirical part, for most European foreign owned companies
the inequality A > B holds therefore, we expect that an increase in their
parent companys tax rate leads to an increase in the subsidiarys propensity
to borrow.
2.3 Bringing the model to the data
So far we have focused on ow rather than stock variables. In the empirical
part of this article however, we will use nancial statement data to estimate
the sign and size of the tax rate e¤ects. Hence, the dependent variable will
be equal to
LS () =
DS ()
ES () +DS ()
; (10)
where DS () and ES () are the subsidiarys debt and equity value, respec-
tively. As shown in Appendix D they are equal to:
DS () =
(
(1 )(1 B)

a.d.,
(1 a)C
r
+
h
(1 )(1 )(1 B)

  (1 a)C
r
i  


2
b.d.,
and
ES () =
8><>:
0 a.d.,
(1  B)

(1  ) 

  (1  a)C
r

 
h
(1  ) 

  (1  a)C
r
i  


2o b.d.,
where a.d.and b.d.mean after defaultand before default, respectively.
Given this result, we expect that the leverage of the subsidiary LS ()
is a complex function of both parent company tax rate (A) and its own
tax rate (B). In particular, the parent companys tax rate causes two o¤-
setting e¤ects (see Figure 1). On the one hand, an increase in the parent
companys tax rate A raises the average MNCs tax rate, thereby increasing
its leverage. This may lead to an increase in the subsidiarys leverage, even
if the optimal weight (1  a) decreases. On the other hand, the increase
in A increases the tax rate di¤erential (A   B) thereby discouraging the
subsidiarys propensity to borrow.16
16Our model shows that tax e¤ects are non-linear and may have an ambiguous sign. We
can therefore understand the empirical results of Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010), who
found that 2B is statistically signicant. Moreover, we can explain why, as argued by
Gordon (2010), tax responses may be limited: this may be due to the o¤setting e¤ects
depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
To analyze tax e¤ects we run a numerical simulation of the subsidiarys
optimal coupon CS  (1  a)C and leverage function (10). We will assume
realistic tax rate values, (i.e., 0  A  0:5, 0  B  0:5) and, in line with
Dixit and Pindyck (p. 157 and p. 193, 1994; 1999), we will set r = 0:04;
 = 0 and  = 0:2. Finally, we will assume that:  = 1, v = 0:2, n = 2 and
 = 0:5 (i.e., the parent company and its subsidiary have equal weight).
Given B = 0:20, we show in Figure 2 simulated optimal coupon CS,
debt DS, equity ES and leverage LS as functions of the parent company tax
rate, A, when A > B., that is, the most common case in our European
data. As can be seen, an increase in A raises the subsidiarys coupon CS.
As a consequence, debt increases while the equity value decreases. For this
reason, the subsidiarys leverage is increasing in A.17 In Figure 2 we also
show that Debt is increasing in the parent tax rate. This implies that given
the book value of a subsidiarys assets, the ratio Debt/Assets may also be
increasing in A. Since our dataset contains both book and market values
(depending on the host country and the characteristics of each company), we
can say that our theoretical prediction holds under both kinds of accounting
standards.
Figure 2
3 Data and preliminary evidence
The relation between tax schemes and rm capital structure for foreign owned
companies can be studied exploiting time variation and cross-national het-
erogeneity of both national and home country tax rates.
AMADEUS by Bureau van Dijk provides standardized annual balance
sheet and prot & loss items from 38 European countries, together with
information on their legal form and ownership structure. We have used the
December 2007 "Top 1.5 Million Companies" release of the dataset, which
includes companies that satised at least one of the following criteria: i)
more than 15 employees; ii) operating revenue of at least 1 million euros;
iii) total assets of at least 2 million euros.18 We focus on limited companies
17Sensitivity analysis on parameters ; n and  is available upon request.
18For UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ukraine and Russian Federation the limits are
1.5 million Euro for operating revenue, 3 million Euro for total assets and 20 employees.
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and limited liability companies, whose ultimate owner is resident abroad in
a known country and is not an individual or a family.19
We dene the ultimate owner as the company which directly or indirectly
possesses at least 50% of the shares of a subsidiary. We set a high share of
ownership because a parent company with a lower level of (direct or indi-
rect) ownership may not be able to a¤ect debt policychoices (Mintz and
Weichenrieder, 2005). Finally, as information on ownership refers to 2005,
we keep only those companies whose accounting data were available at least
for 2005. We therefore selected 31,650 subsidiaries controlled by foreign com-
panies with all the necessary unconsolidated accounts data available for at
least two years (see Table 1). The number of available observations per each
rm varies across countries, ranging from 2 for Macedonia to 7.4 years for
Finland and Greece. The time interval considered goes from 1999 to 2005
for most companies.
Company data are matched with information about statutory tax rates
drawn mainly from KPMGs Corporate Tax Rate Survey. In the time in-
terval considered, corporate income tax rates remained constant in Spain,
Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Sweden and Slovenia. They changed only once
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland,
Luxembourg and Ukraine and more frequently in other countries. Neverthe-
less, Romania (-22 percentage points), Slovakia (-21 pp), Germany, Poland,
Russian Federation (-19 pp) and Bulgaria (-18 pp) experienced dramatic tax
cuts in this period. A similar picture can be drawn for the statutory tax rates
of the ultimate owners. Again, substantial time variation of tax rates can
be observed in a few countries (e.g., Germany, Ireland and Japan among the
most relevant parent countries), while there is no variation at all for others
(e.g., Norway, Sweden and most Caribbean states).
In Table 1 we show the average subsidiary tax rate B and the average
parent tax rate A by subsidiary country. The table indicates that, for in-
stance, the 32 Austrian subsidiaries in the sample face an average tax rate of
31.12%, while the average statutory tax rate of their foreign ultimate owners
is 35.89%. The last column of the table states that for 26.8% of the Austrian
observations, the subsidiarys tax rate is higher than its parent companys
19From Amadeus Internet Guide: Limited Companies: companies whose capital is
divided into shares which can be o¤ered to the general public and whose members are only
liable for its debts to the extent of any amount unpaid on their shares; Limited Liability
Companies: companies whose capital is divided into shares which cannot be o¤ered to the
general public. The liability of its members is limited to the amount of their shares.
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one. On average, the subsidiariestax rates are 1.5 percentage points less
than parent company ones. This may suggest that parent companies prefer
to locate subsidiaries in low-tax countries (see, e.g., Devereux, 2007).
Table 1
In Figure 3 we plot the average subsidiary and parent company tax
rates (together with the 45 line) by either the host (left panel) or the home
country (right panel). The left panel depicts columns 3 (B, on the horizontal
axis) and 4 (A, on the vertical axis) of Table 1. The comparison with the
bisector line makes clear that foreign owned subsidiaries in Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece and Italy face an average tax rate that is higher than
the average tax rate of their parent companies. In the right panel, each
point identies a home country. So for instance, the position of Austria is
determined by the average tax rate faced by Austrian subsidiaries in their
host countries (B = 30:8%, on the horizontal axis) and the average tax rates
of their parent companies in Austria (A = 32:1%, on the vertical axis). The
picture shows that the sample includes a group of subsidiaries owned by
parents resident in tax havens (about 2% of the companies with A  0)
and that global ultimate owners based in US, Germany, France and Japan
(among others) typically own a¢ liates in countries with lower tax rates.
Figure 3
Table 2 shows the percentage of subsidiaries in each host country by the
home country of their parent companies. This gives a clearer picture of the
weight of each home (parent) - host (subsidiary) country tax di¤erential. For
example, 46.9% of Austrian foreign-owned subsidiaries are held by German
companies. Moreover, we can see that: i) many East European subsidiaries
are held by German ultimate owners; ii) about 1/4 of the subsidiaries are
owned by a US global ultimate owner; iii) another quarter is owned by either
a German, British or French company. Therefore, within Europe and US-
European countries tax di¤erentials are by far the most relevant ones for
our dataset and they will play a major role in determining the results of our
regression analysis.
Table 2
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The empirical literature on tax-motivated debt nance uses book data
rather than mark-to-market values. We also follow this approach due to the
characteristics of the dataset. Book and mark-to-market values are likely to
be close only for listed companies, due to the application of international
accounting principles (IAS/IFRS). As for non-listed companies (that is, a
large majority) however, accounting principles may allow us to reckon his-
torical rather than fair values. In this case, the book value of one item may
di¤er from its fair value. In line with most research (see, e.g., Altshuler and
Grubert, 2003, Desai et al., 2003, Jog and Tang, 2001, and Mintz, 2000),
leverage is given by the ratio between debt (long- and short-term liabilities)
and total assets. The return on assets (ROA) is the ratio between earnings
before interest payments and taxes (EBIT) and total assets. For the Z-score
we consider the weights proposed in the literature (see Altman, 2002):
Z   score = 6:56x1 + 3:26x2 + 6:72x3 + 1:05x4;
where x1 is the ratio between working capital and total assets, x2 is the
variation of the "other shareholders funds" over total assets, x3 is the ratio
between EBIT and total assets, and
x4 =
shareholders funds
non current liabilities+ current liabilities
:
Table 3
Table 3 shows the median values of the main balance sheet items and
ratios conditional on the residence country. As the population of rms is
typically composed of many small-medium size companies and a few large
ones, we prefer to refer to median values to summarize the characteristics
of our sample. Focusing on those countries which contribute the most to
the sample as number of subsidiaries (see Table 1), it can be noticed that
the median size of the companies - in terms of operating revenues - is sim-
ilar for Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy and Sweden (ranging
from 11 to 18 millions Euro), is halved in Norway (6 millions Euro) and
is much higher in Germany (90 millions Euro). Such cross-country hetero-
geneity highlights the actual di¤erences in the company size, together with
the variety of accounting and disclosure obligations and practices. Italian,
German and Belgian subsidiaries are those with the highest median leverage:
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these are also the subsidiaries facing the highest statutory tax rates, which
are typically higher than their parentstax rates (see Table 1 and Figure
3). The 31 European countries experienced dramatically di¤erent growth
rates during the period: the average PPP per capita GDP growth rate for
the 133 subsidiaries in Latvia was 7.83%, ten times the growth rate for the
Italians (0.76%).
ROA shows high variability in the sample: it ranges from a median of 4%
for the Luxembourg companies to 18% for Russian ones. Moreover, although
the overall median ROA is positive (5.23%), in the previous year about 25%
of subsidiaries reported losses. This remark is relevant, because our theo-
retical model is based on the assumption of full tax symmetry. Real-world
tax systems however, implement asymmetric devices (such as limited carry-
backward or carryforward provisions). Hence, our empirical analysis must
account for tax asymmetry and the possibility that loss-making rms have
a di¤erent reaction to tax rate changes. In the following regression analysis,
we will therefore pay attention to this possible heterogenous tax e¤ect.
4 Regression analysis
According to our model, the subsidiary leverage LS () is a non-linear func-
tion of the subsidiary and parent company tax rates. Hence equation (10)
can be approximated with the following second-order Taylor expansion:
LS () ' const+ @LS ()
@A

A=A
A +
@LS ()
@B

B=B
B (11)
+
1
2
"
@2LS ()
@ 2A

A=A
 2A +
@2LS ()
@ 2B

B=B
 2B
+ 2
@2LS ()
@A@B
A=A
B=B
AB
35 ;
where  i   i    i with i = A;B: Accordingly, our regression equation
should consider non linearities in A and B either including a quadratic
function or more exible forms: We therefore consider the following speci-
cation for our regression analysis on panel data:
Lit = g (Ait; Bit) + F
0
it 1 +B
0
it + i + "it; (12)
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where i identies the subsidiary rm and t denotes the year of reference,
g (Ait; Bit) is a (possibly non-linear) function of subsidiary and parent com-
pany tax rates, F it 1 is a set of covariates coming from past nancial accounts
of the companies, the variables in Bit are used to control for business cy-
cle e¤ects, i represents the unobservable company-specic time-invariant
heterogeneity and "it is an idiosyncratic error term. Similarly to Fan et al.
(2010), we condition on the ROA, the logarithm of the operating revenues,
the Z-score index, the ratio between xed assets over total assets and a
dummy variable which equals one if at time t   1 the subsidiary generated
negative EBIT.20
Past nancial accounts are preferred to current ones for two reasons.
Firstly, this strategy reduces potential endogeneity generated by accounting
practices. Secondly, we assume that leverage at time t (Lit) is planned at least
one year ahead on the basis of information available at time t 1. We include
a measure of rm protability such as ROA (i.e., the ratio EBIT/total assets)
because more protable companies have lower incentives to implement debt
policies as they could nance their investments through their own resources.
Firms reporting losses have no scal incentives to increase their debt and
they might face credit constraints. At the same time, they are likely to
demand more loans. We evaluate which of the two e¤ects is more relevant by
including in F it 1 a dummy variable indicating whether companies reported
a loss in the previous scal year. Since bankruptcy cost may be lower for
larger rms (Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 1982; Pettit and Singer, 1985) we
include a measure of rm size (the logarithm of the operating revenue, 2005
Euro values).
We also consider the xed-to-total assets ratio in order to assess to what
extent rmsassets structure a¤ects the level of leverage. Indeed, xed assets
are guarantees for creditors and can positively inuence a rms leverage
(Myers, 1977; Scott, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990). Furthermore, the Z-
score index is included in the regression in order to account for a companys
credit worthiness (Desai et al. 2004; Fan et al. 2003). Finally, Bit includes
the GDP growth rate for the subsidiary country and a set of year dummies.21
20Our theoretical model assumes for simplicity that EBIT (i.e., ) evolves according to
a Geometric Brownian Motion. This means that it cannot have negative values. In the
empirical part however, we must control for the sign of :
21We also used other macro variables. In particular we considered variables aimed at
describing national credit markets characteristics in the vein of Rajan and Zingales (1995).
Due to little time variability, however, their predictive power is negligible when the model
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We provide company xed-e¤ect estimates of di¤erent versions of equa-
tion (12): using a within-group estimator, we indirectly control for any source
of time invariant heterogeneity (e.g., parent company, industry and country
e¤ects) and obtain estimates which are robust to the possible correlation
between unobserved heterogeneity and observed covariates. Moreover, we
provide cluster-robust standard errors where the clusters are identied by
the home countries. Finally, we consider also random e¤ects estimates, but
the cluster-robust Hausman test overwhelmingly rejects the overidentication
conditions.
For expositional purposes we rst present our estimates from the following
basic linear version of equation (12):22
Lit = 0 + 1Ait + 2Bit + F
0
it 1 +B
0
it + i + "it: (13)
Table 4 provides the estimates of  and . According to the estimated
equation (13), previous year rm protability, ROAit 1, negatively a¤ects
rm leverage; rms with a negative operating prot in the previous year
have a higher leverage and a higher level of xed assets raises the leverage.23
Our estimates suggest that one percentage point more of GDP growth rate
decreases leverage by 0.4 percentage points.
Moreover, the dummy variable 1 (EBIT t 1 < 0) is estimated to have a
positive impact on leverage: this may be due to the fact that a shortage of
internal resources induces rms to increase borrowing.
The estimated e¤ects of subsidiarys and the parent companys tax rates
(B and A respectively) are illustrated in Table 5: a one percentage point
increase in B is estimated to increase the subsidiary leverage by 0.18 pp,
while the e¤ect of a one pp rise in A causes an increase of 0.05 pp in the
subsidiary leverage.
is estimated using a company xed e¤ect estimator.
22This linear specication in A and B is equivalent to consider a linear specication
in B and (B   A). In the latter, the parameter of (B   A) would be equal to  1
and the parameter of B to 1 + 2.
23The negative e¤ect of ROAit 1 is in line with the Pecking-Order Theory (see, e.g.,
Myers, 1993). According to the standard Trade-O¤Theory however, the higher the prots
the lower the default risk and therefore, the higher the leverage ratio would be. As shown
by Strebulaev (2007) however, a negative relation between debt and protability is also
compatible with a dynamic trade-o¤model, where rms adjust their capital structure over
time.
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Tables 4 & 5
Although appealing due to its plainness, this benchmark specication can
hide important sources of heterogeneity in the responses of companies to a
variation in tax rates. In particular a variation in A and/or B is likely to
di¤erently a¤ect the subsidiaries depending on the sign of the tax rate dif-
ferential (B   A). Furthermore, companies reporting losses (EBITt 1 < 0,
about 25% of the observations, see Table 3) may react to a change in taxa-
tion di¤erently from the companies reporting positive EBITt 1. Combining
the two criteria we can dene four possible cases, whose incidence in each
country is described in Table 6. Sixtyone % of the Austrian observations
refer to subsidiaries which made prot in the previous year (EBITt 1  0)
and whose tax rate is lower than their parent companiestax rate (B < A).
Overall, 44% of the observations fall to this case, a further 31% refers to
subsidiaries with positive past prots and tax rates higher than their home
country tax rate (B > A). The remaining 25% of the observations concern
subsidiaries reporting past losses (EBITt 1 < 0).
Table 6
We consistently enrich the linear specication (13) by introducing the
corresponding interaction terms:
Lit = 0 + 1Ait + 2Bit + (14)
3Ait1 (Bit  Ait) + 4Bit1 (Bit  Ait) +
5Ait1 (Bit < Ait)1 (EBITit 1 < 0) +
6Ait1 (Bit  Ait)1 (EBITit 1 < 0) +
7Bit1 (Bit < Ait)1 (EBITit 1 < 0) +
8Bit1 (Bit  Ait)1 (EBITit 1 < 0) +
91 (Bit  Ait) + 101 (EBITit 1 < 0) +
+F 0it 1 +B
0
it + i + "it:
Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the interaction terms do not alter the
estimates of  and . Ceteris paribus, a subsidiary whose tax rate is higher
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than its parent company tax rate (B > A) has a leverage 8 pp. higher
than a similar company taxed less than its ultimate owner. This result is in
line with the predictions of our model. As pointed out in Section 2.1, when
B > A the MNC has an incentive to shift debt from the home to the host
country. Furthermore, most of the subsidiaries with B > A are located
in Belgium, Germany and Italy, which are the countries with the highest
leverage (see Tables 1 and 3). The e¤ects of tax innovations are remarkably
di¤erent across the four cases (Column 2 Table 5). A one percentage point
increase of B rises the subsidiary leverage by 0.29 pp if its tax rate is less
than its parent company tax rate and the EBIT is positive. In contrast, this
e¤ect is statistically not signicant if the subsidiary tax rate is higher than
its ultimate owners one and the EBIT is negative.
Let us next analyze the impact of A. According to our model, if the
EBIT is positive, the impact of A on LS is ambiguous due to the o¤setting
e¤ects drawn in Figure 1. In particular, our model predicts that if the
subsidiary tax rate is low (i.e., B < A) and the company reported a positive
EBIT, the e¤ect of an increase in A on the subsidiary leverage is positive.
Our estimates are consistent with such a prediction: a one percentage point
increase of the parent tax rate (A) raises the subsidiarys leverage by 0.07
pp., if EBITt 1 > 0 This is the most common case, as it accounts for about
45% of observations. A large portion of observations (30%) has a positive
value of EBITt 1; but it is characterized by the inequality B > A (i.e., the
subsidiary tax rate is higher than its ultimate owners one). In this case, the
estimated e¤ect is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
As pointed out, whenever the subsidiary reported losses, our theoretical
model does not provide predictions: the e¤ect of a change in A is estimated
to be insignicant.
So far, we have considered linear functions of the tax rates. Let us now
generalize the regression function by specifying g (Ait; Bit) in equation (12)
to be a second order polynomial in the tax rates and interacting this function
with the four cases discussed above. The estimates in column 3 of Table 4
conrm our previous results for  and . Column 3 of Table 5 shows that
the marginal e¤ects of A and B on the subsidiarys leverage when B < A
and EBITt 1 > 0 have a sample average in line with the estimates of the
linear model in column (2). Nevertheless, the standard error of the average
e¤ect of A is such that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean of the
change in the subsidiarys leverage due to a variation in its parent company
tax rate is zero. Although more consistent with our theoretical model, the
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use of a non-linear function g (Ait; Bit) does not seem to provide remarkably
di¤erent results from the simpler linear specication.
Overall, we interpret our regression results as evidence consistent with
the predictions of our theoretical model: whenever the subsidiary is making
positive prot, the estimated e¤ects of home (A) and host country (B)
statutory tax rates on the leverage are either positive or negligible.
5 Robustness checks
In this Section, we run some additional regression analysis in order to as-
sess to what extent our conclusions are robust to changes in the estimation
strategy. The set of conditioning variables F it 1 includes lagged nancial
information of the subsidiaries. As rst robustness check we have estimated
the models considering non-lagged variables. For the sake of brevity we do
not include the results in the paper (they are available upon request), but
we can safely say that our main conclusions are not a¤ected by the choice of
using lagged information.
5.1 Year-country dummies
In the previous Section, we have run subsidiary xed e¤ect estimates (using a
within group estimator). Moreover, we have used both the GDP growth rate
and common year dummies as regressors. We have therefore (indirectly)
controlled for host and home country e¤ects as well as for business cycle
e¤ects. Nevertheless, it may be the case that our estimates of tax rates
e¤ects are biased due to omitted country-year e¤ects. For this reason we
introduce two possible extensions: in the rst one, we use a full set of Y ear
Subsidiary Country dummies, while in the second one we apply a full set
of Y ear Parent Country dummies. In the former case, the subsidiary tax
rate e¤ect is canceled out, but the ultimate owner tax rate e¤ect remains
and its estimate is not biased by any omitted variable at the subsidiary
country level. The latter extension works specularly for the subsidiary tax
rate e¤ect. Column (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that the estimated e¤ects
for the subsidiary and parent tax rates are consistent with those of equation
(14) (Column 2, Table 5).
Tables 7 & 8
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5.2 Linked companies
By using xed e¤ects estimates we implicitly condition on any time invari-
ant characteristic of the parent company. Other - time variant - information
about the parent companies may a¤ect the leverage of their subsidiaries and
their omission from the regression equation may bias our estimates. As a
further robustness check, we therefore focus on a sub-sample of subsidiaries
for which the unconsolidated accounts data of their ultimate owner are avail-
able. It is worth noticing that when we complement the subsidiariesdata
with the balance sheets of their ultimate owners, we drop those subsidiaries
whose parent company is located in the US, Japan and other non-European
countries. Furthermore, we cannot recover the accounting data of ultimate
owners such as nancial institutions, banks and governmental agencies.
As a consequence, the number of observations reduces to 41% of the
entire sample. Moreover, this percentage varies across countries (see Table
9) and thus, the nationality mix of this sub-sample is considerably di¤erent
from the original one (e.g., now British subsidiaries account for 15% of the
companies, while they were 28% in the original sample). It is interesting to
observe that the subsidiariesmedian leverage is usually higher than their
ultimate owners one (70% vs. 63%). Moreover, there is no clear relation
between subsidiaries and parent companies leverage at the country level,
that is, there is no prima facie evidence that subsidiaries with high median
leverage are typically owned by foreign companies with high leverage. In
order to further investigate this issue, we add the leverage of the ultimate
owner at t 1 as a control variable to the original equation (14). Its estimated
parameter is not signicantly di¤erent from zero (column 3 of Table 7).
We obtained similar results experimenting with alternative global ultimate
owners information, e.g. protability. The e¤ects of the subsidiarys tax
rates B are in line with the benchmark case (see, column 3 of Table 8),
the impact of A when B < A and subsidiaries report positive EBITt 1
is still positive though is not statistically signicant. On the opposite, when
B < A and EBITt 1  0 the impact of A on the subsidiarys leverage is
estimated to be signicantly negative. In this latter case, we can say that
the absence of a positive EBIT together with a low subsidiary tax rate makes
borrowing unattractive in terms of tax savings.
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5.3 Cross-border tax rates
In this article, we have used statutory corporate income tax rates. As a
further robustness check we replace statutory tax rates with cross-border
e¤ective tax rates (). These are a (non-linear) combination of statutory
tax rates (A and B) and withholding taxes (see Huizinga et al., 2008). In
many cases (even before the introduction of the parent-subsidiary directive
between EU Member States), withholding tax rates have been low and the
tax treatment of cross-border transactions has been almost unchanged over
the sample period. We therefore expect the e¤ect of a variation in  on the
subsidiary leverage to be evaluated in the between of the e¤ects of A and B.
Moreover, in line with Huizinga et al. (2008), we also consider the possible
e¤ect of the relative tax (dis)advantage of equity and internal debt (denoted
as ').24
The sample is reduced to 38% of the original one, both because of the
di¤erent time span and because of the focus on the European parent com-
panies (see Table 9). Not surprisingly, the value of the average e¤ective
marginal tax rates are very close to the corresponding values of the statutory
tax rates. The e¤ective marginal tax rate () on the subsidiarys tax rate
is estimated to have a signicant positive e¤ect (column 3 Table 8), whose
magnitude, about 0.13, fullls our expectations. As Huizinga et al. (2008,
see Table 11, column 1), the relative tax advantage of debt over equity (')
is not statistically signicant.
6 Conclusions
In this article we have used a trade-o¤ model to analyze a MNCs nancial
choices in terms of leverage and debt shifting. As we have assumed, default
is a contingent event, which depends on the EBITs volatility as well as on
other deep parameters (such as the risk-free interest rate and the expected
growth of EBIT).
Given this framework, we have shown that the parent companys tax rate
can have a positive e¤ect on a subsidiarys leverage. The reasoning behind
our nding is straightforward. On the one hand, an increase in the parent
24The relative taxation of equity and internal debt ' is dened as the di¤erence bewteen
tax rates on cross-border interest and tax rates on cross-border dividends. We wish to
thank Luc Laeven and Gaetan Nicodeme for providing us with their tax rate dataset.
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companys tax rate reduces the tax benet of shifting debt from the parent
company to its subsidiary. On the other hand, the tax rate increase leads to
an increase in the MNCs overall tax rate, thereby increasing the tax benet
of interest deductibility. This latter e¤ect encourages both the parent and
the subsidiary to raise debt. As we have shown, using realistic parameter
values, this latter e¤ect is expected to dominate the former and therefore, a
higher parent tax rate can increase a subsidiarys leverage.
In the empirical part we have tested this theoretical nding. Using the
AMADEUS dataset we have shown that a one percentage point increase in
the foreign country tax rate causes on average a 0.2 percentage points increase
in the subsidiary leverage, but that the size of the e¤ect goes from 0.29 pp
for those subsidiary whose tax rate is lower than parent tax rate and reports
positive earnings to zero for those whose tax rate are higher than their global
ultimate owner tax rate and reported negative earnings. At the same time,
a one percentage point increase in the parent company tax rate causes a
0.07 percentage points rise in of the subsidiary leverage in case B < A and
EBITt 1 > 0. This latter e¤ect, usually ignored in the relevant literature, is
fully consistent with our theoretical model and suggests that there are cases
in which, when the parent company tax rate increases, the positive e¤ect
on leverage due to the overall increase in the tax rate prevails on the debt
shifting incentives. In this case, evidence supports our idea that an increase
in the parent companys tax rate can positively a¤ect a subsidiarys leverage.
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A The derivation of (5)
Let us rst calculate the value of debt under the assumption that, before
default, the lender is tax exempt.25 When, in the event of default, the lender
becomes shareholder however, it is subject to the source-based tax levied on
the subsidiary. Using dynamic programming, debt can be written as
D () =

(1  b)dt+ e rdt [D( + d)] a.d.,
Cdt+ e rdt [D( + d)] b.d.,
(15)
where  [:] is the expectation operator, and a.d. and b.d. mean after default
and before default, respectively. Expanding the RHS of (15), applying Itôs
Lemma and rearranging gives
rD() = L+ D() +
2
2
2D(); (16)
where L = (1  b); C; D()  @D()@ and D()  @2D()@2 : The general
closed-form solution of function (16) is
D () =

(1 b)

+
P2
i=1Bi
i a.d.,
C
r
+
P2
i=1Di
i b.d.,
(17)
where  = r    and
1 =
1
2
  
2
+
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
> 1;
2 =
1
2
  
2
 
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
< 0
are the two roots of the characteristic equation 
2
2
(   1) +    r = 0: To
calculate Bi and Di for i = 1; 2, we need three boundary conditions. First of
all we assume that whenever  goes to zero, the lenders claim is nil, namely
condition D (0) = 0 holds: This implies that B2 = 0: Secondly, we assume
that nancial bubbles do not exist. This means that B1 = D1 = 0:26 Thirdly,
25It is well-known that e¤ective tax rates on capital income are fairly low. For simplicity
we assume that the lenders pre-default tax burden is nil.
26For further details on these boundary conditions see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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we must consider that at point  = , the pre-default value of debt must be
equal to the post-default one, net of the default cost. Applying Assumption
6 and using the two branches of (17) we therefore obtain
(1  b)

 

 (1  b)


| {z }
default cost
=
C
r
+D2
2
:
Solving for D2 gives
D2 =

(1  ) (1  b)

  C
r


 2
:
We can therefore write the value of debt as follows:
D () =
(
(1 b)

a.d.,
C
r
+
h
(1 )(1 b)

  C
r
i  


2 b.d. (18)
Before default, D () consists of two terms. The rst one, C
r
, is the present
value of a perpetual rent with the discount rate r. The second term accounts
for any future expected change in protability caused by default. In partic-
ular, the term
 


2 measures the present value of 1 Euro contingent on the
event default. After default, the lender becomes shareholder and her credit is
therefore converted into equity. The rms value is therefore equal to (1 b)

.
Let us next calculate the value of equity. Applying dynamic programming
we can write:
E () =

0 a.d.,
N () dt+ e rdt [E( + d)] b.d.
(19)
Expanding the RHS of (19), applying Itôs Lemma, eliminating all terms
multiplied by (dt)2 and dividing by dt gives:
rE () = N () + E() +
2
2
2E () ; (20)
where E ()  @E()@ and E ()  @
2E()
@2
: Substituting (2) into (20) and
solving gives
E () =

0 a.d.,
(1 b)

  (1 C(a))C
r
+
P2
i=1Ai
i b.d.
(21)
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Let us next calculate Ai with i = 1; 2: In the absence of nancial bubbles,
we have A1 = 0. Moreover, to calculate A2 we let the two branches of (21)
meet at point  = , thereby obtaining
E
 


=
(1  b)

  (1  C (a))C
r
+ A2
2
= 0: (22)
Solving (22) for A2 gives
A2 =  

(1  b)

  (1  C (a))C
r


 2
;
so that the value of equity is equal to:
E () =
8><>:
0 a.d.,
(1 b)

  (1 C(a))C
r
 
h
(1 b)

  (1 C(a))C
r
i  


2 b.d. (23)
Summing (18) and (23) gives the value function (5).
B The MNCs choices
Di¤erentiating V (C; a; ) with respect to a and C gives the following rst
order conditions:
@V (C; a; )
@a
=
C
r
@C (a)
@a
 

 (1  b)

@
@C (a)
@C (a)
@a
+
C
r
@C (a)
@a



2
(24)
+2

 (1  b)

+
C (a)C
r



2
@
@C (a)
@C (a)
@a

 1
= 0
and
@V (C; a; )
@C
=
C (a)
r
+ 2

 (1  b)

+
C (a)C
r



2
@
@C

 1
(25)
 

 (1  b)

@
@C
+
C (a)
r



2
= 0:
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Using (24) and rearranging gives:
@V (C; a; )
@a
=  hi @C (a)
@a
= 0;
with
 hi 
"
C
r
+


C   C
r



2#
| {z }
>0
+
8>>>><>>>>:2
h


(1  C (a))C + C(a)Cr
i  


2 @
@C (a)

 1
| {z }
 1
1 C (a)<0
9>>>>=>>>>; > 0:
This means that the optimal value of a is such that:
@C (a)
@a
= A   B + n (  a) = 0 with @
2
C (a)
@a2
< 0;
and therefore,
a = +
A   B
n
:
Recall now f.o.c. (25). Rearranging one obtains:
C =
1  b
1  C (a)
"
C (a)
(1  2)

r

(1  C (a)) + C (a)
#  12 :
C Comparative statics
Given (8) and (7), it is equal to CS = (1  a)C. Applying logs leads to:
logCS = log (1  a) + logC
= log + log (1  b)  log [1  C (a)]
  1
2

log C (a
)  log (1  2)  log

r (1  C (a)) 

+ C (a
)

:
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Di¤erentiating logCS w.r.t. A gives:
1
C
dC
dA
=
24 1  B      A B2 
[1  B    (A   B)]
h
1  B    (A   B)  (A B)
2
2n
i
35
| {z }

>0
A   B
n| {z }
/(A B)
+
24  1
2
r

 
+ A B
n

C (a)
h
r(1 C(a))

+ C (a)
i
35
| {z }
>0
:
If A > B; we have dC

dA
> 0: Otherwise the e¤ect is ambiguous.
D The subsidiarys leverage
D.1 The subsidiarys debt
To calculate the subsidiary debt value we follow the same procedure as before.
The debt value function has therefore the following form:
DS () =
(
(1 )(1 B)

+
P2
i=1 Fi
i a.d.,
(1 a)C
r
+
P2
i=1Mi
i b.d.
Remember that whenever goes to zero, the lendersDS () is nil. Moreover,
ruling out nancial bubbles gives F1 = F2 = M1 = 0: To calculate M2 we
need to apply the value matching condition at point :
(1  ) (1  B)

 

 (1  ) (1  B)


| {z }
default cost
=
(1  a)C
r
+M2
2
:
Therefore we obtain:
DS () =
(
(1 )(1 B)

a.d.,
(1 a)C
r
+
h
(1 )(1 )(1 B)

  (1 a)C
r
i  


2
b.d.
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D.2 The subsidiarys equity
As shown in (2), the subsidiarys after-tax prot is
NS () = (1  B) [(1  )  CS] : (26)
Using (26) and applying dynamic programming we can calculate the sub-
sidiarys equity value:
ES () =

0 a.d.,
(1  B)

(1  ) 

  CS
r

+
P2
i=1Gi
i b.d.
(27)
As usual, in the absence of nancial bubbles, we have G1 = 0. To nd G2 we
apply the following boundary condition, which states that, at point , the
subsidiarys equity value is nil, i.e.,
ES
 


= (1  B)

(1  ) 

  CS
r

+G2
2
= 0:
We therefore obtain
G2 =   (1  B)

(1  ) 

  CS
r


 2
;
so that the value of equity is equal to:
ES () =
8><>:
0 a.d.,
(1  B)

(1  ) 

  CS
r

 
h
(1  ) 

  CS
r
i  


2o b.d. (28)
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E Sample Correlation Matrix
Leverage B A 1 (B > A) lnRe venuet 1
Leverage 1
B 0:0297
 1
A  0:0095 0:1178 1
1 (B > A) 0:0163
 0:3916  0:5579 1
lnRe venuet 1 0:0349 0:1094 0:0820  0:0225 1
ROAt 1  0:1450 0:0015 0:0040 0:0053 0:0385 
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

t 1  0:0877  0:0420  0:0193  0:0047  0:0184
1 (EBIT t 1 < 0) 0:2550  0:0219  0:0082  0:0140  0:1375
Zscoret 1  0:0282 0:0001 0:0025  0:0031  0:0264
GDP growth rate  0:0431  0:4272 0:0152  0:2160  0:0768
ROAt 1
 
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

t 1 1 (EBIT t 1 < 0) Zscoret 1
GDP
growth rate
ROAt 1 1 
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

t 1  0:0394 1
1 (EBIT t 1 < 0)  0:2629 0:0727 1
Zscoret 1 0:0018 0:0221 0:0057 1
GDP growth rate 0:0181 0:0765  0:0265  0:0048 1
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Figure 1: Tax e¤ects on subsidiarys leverage.
36
Figure 2: Simulated Equity, Debt, Optimal Coupon, Leverage. Parameter
values:  = 1; r = 0:04;  = 0:2;  = 0;  = 0:4;  = 0:5; n = 2; B = 0:2:
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Figure 3: Average subsidiary and parent tax rates, by subsidiary (left panel)
or parent country (right panel).
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Subsidiary Number of Number of years Subsidiary Parent B > A
country subsidiaries per subsidiary tax rate (%) tax rate (%) (%)
Austria 32 5.6 31.12 35.89 26.8
Belgium 2057 7.2 37.12 34.41 64.58
Bulgaria 74 6.5 22.93 34.43 6.61
Czech Republic 516 6.4 29.29 34.62 20.6
Germany 987 5.7 41.87 34.44 78.99
Denmark 751 2.9 28.97 31.3 47.48
Estonia 316 7 25.63 29.76 5.4
Spain 2777 7.3 35 35.18 50.35
Finland 719 7.4 28.37 31.38 42.05
France 5892 7.2 35.25 34.18 52.75
Great Britain 8761 7 30.11 33.77 22.7
Greece 312 7.4 36.02 34.57 65.92
Croatia 176 6.5 22.19 34.43 7.28
Hungary 137 4.4 16.9 34.51 2.16
Ireland 550 4.7 13.77 33.19 2.38
Iceland 3 5.6 20.67 32.67 22.22
Italy 1870 7.1 39.16 34.37 84.13
Lithuania 77 5.1 15 29.79 1.31
Luxembourg 33 5.6 32.42 35.35 22.12
Latvia 133 7.2 15 30.42 3.08
Macedonia 2 2 15 35.16 0
Netherlands 733 6.1 33.89 35.21 43.5
Norway 1074 7.4 28 30.96 46.6
Poland 903 5.5 24.04 33.47 10.26
Portugal 353 6.6 32.16 35.33 23.23
Romania 689 6.6 25.42 34.26 14.62
Russia 100 6 27.48 32.13 29.41
Sweden 1319 7 28 32.56 23.9
Slovenia 13 7.3 25 37.23 1.33
Slovakia 110 5.3 23.59 32.94 19.12
Ukraine 181 5 28.56 27.18 51.36
Total 31650 7 32.25 33.81 41.27
Table 1: Number of subsidiaries, average numebr of years available per sub-
sidiary, average statutory tax rates the subsidiaires (B) and their parents
(A), percentage of subsidiaries whose statutory tax rate is higher than their
parent companys statutory tax rate.
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Parent company country
Subsidiary Germany France Great Other Other United Other Rest of
country Britain EU Europe States OECD the World
Austria 46.9 6.3 3.1 15.6 9.4 6.3 6.3 6.3
Belgium 8.7 24 7.6 29.4 4.9 19.2 3.8 2.4
Bulgaria 17.6 5.4 4.1 36.5 16.2 14.9 5.4 0
Czech Republic 17.3 13.2 5.4 33.1 6.4 18.2 4.7 1.7
Germany - 15.1 10 28.8 7.7 24.4 11.3 2.7
Denmark 8.1 7.1 7.3 39.2 11.3 21 3.2 2.8
Estonia 5.7 4.1 4.8 72.2 7.6 4.4 1.3 -
Spain 14.5 18.4 10.3 28.4 4.7 16.2 5.4 2.1
Finland 4.6 7 4.5 56.9 6.3 16.1 3.1 1.7
France 11.1 - 13.2 35.1 7.8 23.8 6 3
Great Britain 8.2 10.2 - 22.7 6.4 34 10.1 8.4
Greece 8.7 19.9 10.6 29.8 5.8 19.9 3.9 1.6
Croatia 21.6 10.8 6.3 42.1 6.8 11.4 1.1 -
Hungary 19 8.8 0.7 45.3 7.3 15.3 0.7 2.9
Ireland 7.5 5.6 26.7 17.3 4.4 29.3 5.3 4
Iceland - - 33.3 - - 66.7 - -
Italy 10.4 21.2 7.4 22.5 7.5 25 3.4 2.5
Lithuania 6.5 2.6 - 71.4 14.3 5.2 - -
Luxembourg 21.2 21.2 12.1 36.4 - 9.1 - -
Latvia 7.5 7.5 2.3 72.9 3 4.5 0.8 1.5
Macedonia 50 - - 50 - - - -
Netherlands 9.8 9.6 12.4 18 6.4 27 8.9 7.9
Norway 5.2 5.1 7.5 60.5 4.1 13.8 1.3 2.4
Poland 16.9 13.6 6.3 39.1 5.8 12.4 3.4 2.4
Portugal 10.2 22.4 2.3 40.8 4.8 13.3 4.8 1.4
Romania 16.6 14.5 7 42.4 4.9 9.9 2.9 1.9
Russia 22 7 1 52 6 6 3 3
Sweden 8.8 9.9 6.2 38.4 15.3 17.1 2.4 1.9
Slovenia 15.4 38.5 7.7 15.4 7.7 15.4 - -
Slovakia 12.7 13.6 1.8 41.8 2.7 23.6 2.7 0.9
Ukraine 7.7 3.9 7.2 52.5 13.3 7.2 2.8 5.5
Total 9.9 10.6 6.9 31.8 6.9 23.5 6.2 4.2
Table 2: Percentage of subsidiaries in the "Subsidiary country" (row) by
parent companys country of residence (column). -: not applicable or no
companies in the dataset.
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Subsidiary Leverage Operating ROA Fixed AssetsTotal Assets Z-score EBITt 1 < 0 GDP growth
country (%) revenues (%) (%) (%) rate (%)
Austria 51.3 80,390 9.75 34.67 3.76 11.34 1.84
Belgium 73.72 13,416 4.24 19.25 2.58 23.76 1.63
Bulgaria 67.28 6,806 7.22 40.53 3.56 20.72 5.87
Czech Republic 55.2 19,341 7.52 39.42 3.04 15.93 3.59
Germany 74.59 89,708 5.4 27.39 2.98 23.54 1
Denmark 64.85 15,293 6.27 16.23 3.49 22.96 2.04
Estonia 56.68 4,552 9.4 29.33 3.31 15.43 7.5
Spain 67.92 15,307 5.8 21.84 4.5 20.55 2.29
Finland 59.87 6,527 10.28 12.62 3.99 19.37 2.78
France 69.41 11,122 4.34 17.82 2.69 27.92 1.46
Great Britain 70.29 14,102 4.51 15.65 2.58 29.45 2.26
Greece 75 13,597 8.06 11.51 3.84 18.22 3.54
Croatia 67.81 6,899 6.47 23.37 2.9 20.92 4.43
Hungary 67.38 6,366 5.32 39.65 2.58 24.69 4.42
Ireland 67.55 12,011 4.82 15.01 2.81 25.69 3.4
Iceland 56.75 271,651 18.59 63.39 3.56 0 3.93
Italy 77.23 17,925 5.13 13.28 2.95 20.03 0.76
Lithuania 64.25 4,915 6.41 22.94 3.45 17.47 7.3
Luxembourg 64.48 58,537 4.07 29.51 4.08 14.42 3.4
Latvia 71.06 6,327 6.96 27.08 2.95 21.43 7.83
Macedonia 9.7 104,335 32.89 50.9 14.85 0 3.79
Netherlands 64.44 50,570 6.48 24.96 5.23 19.77 1.7
Norway 72.92 6,546 7.07 14.35 4 24.75 1.71
Poland 63.61 15,544 6.72 37.71 3.27 22.73 3.59
Portugal 64.34 25,924 5.82 22.97 3.74 19.82 1.01
Romania 70.5 4,708 8.96 34.15 4.11 22.19 5.05
Russia 60.1 39,093 18.11 42.54 3.81 10.59 6.52
Sweden 69.49 11,443 5.64 22.57 3.12 26.61 2.78
Slovenia 35.57 30,011 8.46 45.53 4.41 0 3.74
Slovakia 51.71 22,453 9.04 48.09 3.31 12.94 4.72
Ukraine 51.6 13,828 4.09 58.61 3.09 29.98 7.7
Total 69.79 13,254 5.23 18.67 3.07 25.22 2.2
Table 3: Median values of leverage, operating revenues (th Euro, 2005 prices),
ROA, xed to total assets ratio and Z-score; percentage of subsidiaries record-
ing negative EBIT in the past year, average PPP real per capita GDP growth
rate.
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(1) (2) (3)
Linear Linear Polynomials
log(Revenuet 1) 1.261*** 1.267*** 1.270***
(0.1395) (0.1393) (0.1377)
ROAt 1 -0.0808*** -0.0801*** -0.0799***
(0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) 
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

t 1 0.0322*** 0.0322*** 0.0324***
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0116)
Zscoret 1/1000 -0. 225** -0. 215** -0. 218**
(0.1077) (0.103) (0.1035)
GDP growth rate -0.409*** -0.376*** -0.381***
(0.1032) (0.1026) (0.1095)
1 (EBIT t 1 < 0) 6.699*** 14.54*** 3.026
(0.3665) (2.5292) (7.407)
1(B  A) 7.959*** 24.04**
(2.3366) (7.7483)
R2o 0.05 0.05 0.05
Observations 157,227
Num. companies 31,650
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Subsidiary xed e¤ects estimates. Home country cluster-robust
standard errors in parentheses. All specications include year dummies.
R2o = 
2(Lit; L^it) where L^it is predicted without taking into account the
individual xed e¤ect. Column 1: linear e¤ects of A and B. Col-
umn 2: linear e¤ects of A and B interacted with the dummies of the
four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0)  1(B > A). Column 3: second order
polynomials in A and B interacted with the dummies of the four cases
1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A).
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(1) (2) (3)
Linear Linear Polynomials
E¤ect of B
Entire sample 0.184*** 0.203*** 0.1581***
(0.0417) (0.0365) (0.0452)
(B < A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.290*** 0.241***
(0.0448) (0.0471)
(B  A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.148*** 0.104
(0.0542) (0.0696)
(B < A) & EBITt 1  0 0.253** 0.131*
(0.0574) (0.0738)
(B  A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.0784 0.0087
(0.1069) (0.1318)
E¤ect of A
Entire sample 0.0470* 0.0103 0.0085
(0.0282) (0.0467) (0.0582)
(B < A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.0737** 0.0711
(0.028) (0.0572)
(B  A) & EBITt 1 > 0 -0.0135 -0.0147
(0.0785) (0.0737)
(B < A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.0957 -0.0468
(0.0701) (0.0822)
(B  A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.0303 -0.107
(0.1013) (0.1165)
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Sample average marginal e¤ects of subsidiary and parent tax rates.
Home country cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 1:
linear e¤ects of A and B. Column 2: linear e¤ects of A and B interacted
with the dummies of the four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A). Column
3: second order polynomials in A and B interacted with the dummies of
the four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A).
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Subsidiary B < A B > A B < A B > A
country EBITt 1  0 EBITt 1  0 EBITt 1 < 0 EBITt 1 < 0
Austria 60.82 24.74 12.37 2.06
Belgium 26.49 49.8 8.93 14.78
Bulgaria 73.57 5.11 19.82 1.5
Czech Republic 65.82 16.37 13.57 4.23
Germany 16.36 59.21 4.65 19.78
Denmark 38.88 34.19 13.65 13.29
Estonia 77.58 4.64 17.02 0.76
Spain 39.99 39.27 9.66 11.08
Finland 46.01 34.87 11.94 7.18
France 34.3 38.04 12.96 14.7
Great Britain 54.82 16.3 22.47 6.4
Greece 27.94 53.29 6.15 12.62
Croatia 71.79 5.09 20.92 2.2
Hungary 71.91 1.85 25.93 0.31
Ireland 71.19 1.13 26.44 1.25
Iceland 77.78 22.22 0 0
Italy 12.79 67.9 3.07 16.24
Lithuania 77.73 1.31 20.96 0
Luxembourg 65.38 21.15 12.5 0.96
Latvia 73.25 1.96 23.67 1.12
Macedonia 100 0 0 0
Netherlands 45.94 34.64 10.56 8.85
Norway 38.68 35.56 14.72 11.05
Poland 68.37 7.22 21.37 3.04
Portugal 60.42 19.18 16.34 4.05
Romania 66.05 10.09 19.33 4.53
Russia 62.82 24.71 7.76 4.71
Sweden 55.14 17.54 20.96 6.36
Slovenia 98.67 1.33 0 0
Slovakia 69.41 16.47 11.47 2.65
Ukraine 33.01 34.13 15.63 17.22
Total 43.57 31.13 15.16 10.14
Table 6: Percentage of observations by sign of the di¤erential tax rates (B 
A) and reporting losses in the past year (EBITt 1).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year  Year  Linked Cross-border
Subs Country Parent. Country companies tax rates
log(Revenuet 1) 1.296*** 1.239*** 1.350*** 0.743**
(0.1382) (0.1355) (0.1624) (0.3131)
ROAt 1 -0.0803*** -0.0799*** -0.0625*** -0.0532***
(0.016) (0.0163) (0.0138) (0.0135) 
Fixed Assets
Total Assets

t 1 0.0332*** 0.0309*** 0.0335 0.0366*
(0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0226) (0.0183)
Zscoret 1/1000 -0. 221** -0. 216** -1.76*** 0.0044
(0.1077) (0.1069) (0.6027) (0.1041)
GDP growth rate -0.391*** -0.392*** -0.269**
(0.1092) (0.1396) (0.1046)
1 (EBIT t 1 < 0) 9.586*** 11.84*** 14.47*** 4.971***
(1.445) (1.7524) (4.177) (0.3365)
1(B  A) 3.420* 8.149** 5.626**
(1.9764) (2.5538) (2.3465)
GUO leveraget 1 -0.021
(0.027)
R2o 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.024
Observations 157,227 64,888 60,120
Num. companies 31,650 14,567 15,628
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Subsidiary xed e¤ects estimates. Home country cluster-robust
standard errors in parentheses. All specications include year dummies.
R2o = 
2(Lit; L^it) where L^it is predicted without taking into account the in-
dividual xed e¤ect. Column 1: Subsidiary country  year dummies, linear
e¤ects of A interacted with the dummies of the four cases 1(EBITt 1 <
0)  1(B > A). Column 2: Ultimate owner country  year dum-
mies, linear e¤ects of B interacted with the dummies of the four cases
1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A). Column 3: sample includes only subsidiaries
with information on their parent leverage. Linear e¤ects of A and B in-
teracted with the dummies of the four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A).
Column 4: sample includes only subsidiaries with available information on
e¤ective subsidiary tax rate () and tax incentive to debt shitng (') ac-
cording to Huizinga et al. (2008). Linear e¤ects of  and '.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year  Year  Linked Cross-border
Subs Country Par. Country companies tax rates
E¤ect of B E¤ect of 
Entire sample 0.2073*** 0.189*** 0.127**
(0.0359) (0.0596) (0.0477)
(B < A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.344*** 0.261***
(0.0395) (0.0538)
(B  A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.109*** 0.151*
(0.054) (0.0871)
(B < A) & EBITt 1  0 0.188** 0.209**
(0.061) (0.0878)
(B  A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.0559 0.0629
(0.0846) (0.1886)
E¤ect of A E¤ect of '
Entire sample 0.0083 -0.0306 -0.0283
(0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0246)
(B < A) & EBITt 1 > 0 0.0686** 0.0484
(0.0208) (0.039)
(B  A) & EBITt 1 > 0 -0.0224 -0.0257
(0.0718) (0.0797)
(B < A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.00399 -0.122
(0.0508) (0.0912)
(B  A) & EBITt 1  0 -0.137 -0.196*
(0.0926) (0.1095)
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: Sample average marginal e¤ects of subsidiary and parent tax rates.
Home country cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 1:
Subsidiary country  year dummies, linear e¤ects of A interacted with the
dummies of the four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0)  1(B > A). Column 2: Ul-
timate owner country  year dummies, linear e¤ects of B interacted with
the dummies of the four cases 1(EBITt 1 < 0)  1(B > A). Column 3:
sample includes only subsidiaries with information on their parent leverage.
Linear e¤ects of A and B interacted with the dummies of the four cases
1(EBITt 1 < 0) 1(B > A). Column 4: sample includes only subsidiaries
with available information on e¤ective subsidiary tax rate () and tax incen-
tive to debt shitng (') according to Huizinga et al. (2008). Linear e¤ects
of  and '.
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Linked companies E¤ective tax rates
Subsidiary % of Subsidiary Parent % of Subsidiary  '
country sample leverage (%) leverage (%) sample leverage (%) (%) (%)
Austria 51.55 56.34 60.35 26.8 53.13 35.02 -0.26
Belgium 55.37 73.96 66.16 47.39 75.34 39.14 4.24
Bulgaria 50.75 67.47 52.44 1.5 64.12 31.94 1.14
Czech Republic 51.9 54.92 63.75 27.5 56.83 35.93 -1.9
Germany 36.39 76.2 63.53 26.23 76.2 46.03 12.75
Denmark 51.6 65.51 63.33 0.57 61.91 30 -1.53
Estonia 61.62 55.73 58.67 53.7 58.34 6.66 -23.57
Spain 45.21 67.93 66.94 44.65 68.12 35.17 -1.89
Finland 58.83 58.15 59 48.72 59.12 29.06 -1.52
France 42.09 70.32 61.61 41.87 70.02 36.94 2.54
Great Britain 25.02 71.09 65.2 29.73 71.47 30.46 -3.65
Greece 51.92 74.66 64.01 41.99 68.73 37.31 0.76
Croatia 44.39 65.71 65.78 38.03 70.32 32.14 -4.89
Hungary 55.56 68.37 66.72 30.56 67.41 24.98 -14.83
Ireland 37.13 66.52 66.8 19.38 68.97 24.72 -7.48
Iceland 66.67 54.46 55.97 0 - - -
Italy 48.65 77.59 62.36 41.87 77.32 40.95 6.06
Lithuania 66.38 64.26 59.21 17.03 57.36 20.16 -9.34
Luxembourg 54.81 67.77 57.56 27.88 69.31 35.26 0.04
Latvia 59.38 70.55 58.02 41.46 72.77 25.31 -4.45
Macedonia 100 9.7 43.76 0 - - -
Netherlands 35.18 64.9 62.49 25.17 69.18 34.81 -0.83
Norway 54.03 73.77 60.39 53.4 72.61 28.68 -2.15
Poland 49.43 62.72 66.14 34.25 66.43 31.99 -3.78
Portugal 47.89 65.42 64.1 44.47 67.04 34.73 -2.47
Romania 49.01 69.15 64.55 43.67 74.46 33.12 -3.53
Russia 36.47 55.7 61.02 3.06 86.42 30.46 0.3
Sweden 53.53 70.26 62.07 50.25 69.81 28.17 -4.4
Slovenia 56 32.87 63.15 20 34.59 28.75 -8.5
Slovakia 45.88 52.97 58.76 0.88 53.71 31.07 14.9
Ukraine 8.29 51.27 59.53 0 - - -
Total 41.27 70.16 63.44 38.24 70.78 33.83 -0.55
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for robustness checks subsamples: percent-
age of observations with respect to the sample used in the benchmark case,
median subsidiary and parent leverage, average e¤ective tax rate () and
relative taxation of equity and internal debt (') computed by Huizinga et
al. (2008). The relative taxation of equity and internal debt ' is dened
as the di¤erence bewteen tax rates on cross-border interest and tax rates on
cross-border dividends.
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